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JURADO V. POPEJOY CONSTRUCTION CO.: DETERMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISPARATE AWARDS OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION DEATH BENEFITS
TO NONRESIDENT ALIEN
DEPENDENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees all "persons" residing within
the territorial boundaries of the United States the right to the equal pro-
tection of all state laws and proceedings.' Since 1886, the United States
1. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "[n] o State shall'..
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This equal protection guarantee governs all state actions
when classifying individuals with regard to various benefits and burdens under
state law. See generally JEROME A. BARRON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 549, 549-50 (1992) (discussing judicial review of state actions under Equal
Protection Clause); JOHN E. NowAx, CONSTrrTuTIoNAL LAw 568, 568-73 (4th ed.
1991) (analyzing equal protection principles and judicial review of legislative classi-
fications). Although there is no explicit equal protection clause governing federal
laws and government actions, federal classifications that are based on impermissi-
ble equal protection criteria contravene the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (reviewing federal law
segregating schools in District of Columbia under equal protection component of
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); see, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7
n.8 (1977) (finding unique federal interests support lesser standard of judicial re-
view of federal legislative classifications based on alienage), appeal dismissed sub
noma. Rabinovitch v. Nyquist, 435 U.S. 901 (1977); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 639 n.2 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975). See
generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55
N.C. L. REv. 540 (1977) (discussing constitutionality of alienage classifications
within federal legislation).
The Supreme Court has increasingly relied on equal protection principles to
guarantee individuals protection in the exercise of their fundamental rights or in
the elimination of classifications based on "suspect" criteria. See United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (identifyingjudicial role in pro-
tecting individual fundamental rights and "discrete and insular minorities" usiig
Equal Protection Clause); see als0Joseph Tussman &Jacobus ten Broek, The Equal
Protection oftheLaws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949) (defining and analyzing equal
protection concepts and standards' of review).
The equal protection guarantee is only implicated when the government clas-
sifies individuals for the purpose of differing governmental benefits or burdens.
See NowAy, supra, at 569. When a government action is not based on a classifica-
tion of persons, due process applies rather than equal protection. Id. at 570.
Equal protection ensures that legislative classifications are proper and that legisla-
tive line-drawing is not arbitrary. Id. Procedural due process determines whether
an individual is properly placed within a specific classification; it is the means for
adjudicating individual claims. Id. Under the Equal Protection Clause, states are
not prohibited from creating and applying legislative classifications; however, the
classifications must be related to a proper government purpose. See F. S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (stating classification must be
"reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
(705)
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Supreme Court has recognized resident aliens as "persons" under the
Fourteenth Amendment thereby protecting them from discrimination, re-
gardless of race, color or nationality.2 Throughout the early and mid-
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike"); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (giving states wide discretion in classifying individuals
under police laws); see also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976) (requiring that government classifications further legitimate gov-
ernment interest). See generally BARRON, supra, at 553-56; NowAR, supra, at 569-73.
Governmental classifications that are based on impermissible criteria or that place
an arbitrary burden on a specific group of persons violate the Equal Protection
Clause. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. A law containing legislative classifi-
cations is impermissible if discriminatory on its face, by the means of classification
it employs, or in its application and effects. See BARRON, supra, at 563-67, 570, 577-
94; NowAK, supra, at 570-73. A law may appear to be fair and impartial on its face;
however, if unfairly applied it will be held unjust and a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1896) (finding unconstitu-
tional California zoning law which discriminated against aliens in effect, although
not discriminatory on its face); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (finding
exclusion of black citizens from juries violated Equal Protection Clause case even
though jury selection statute not discriminatory on face). For a further discussion
of equal protection principles and the specific standards of review that courts em-
ploy under the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 26-40 and accompanying
text. For a further discussion of the equal protection of aliens under the Four-
teenth Amendment, see infra notes 41-70 and accompanying text.
Many commentators argue that equality has no real substantive meaning and
should be eliminated from legal analysis. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equal-
ity, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537, 542, 547 (1982). Westen argues that when one invokes
the principles of equality, one is merely invoking a claim to a specific substantive
right. Id. at 542, 552. Westen believes that reliance on equal protection principles
serves only to confuse the nature of an individual's claim. Id. at 579.
Still other commentators feel that the Equal Protection Clause includes prin-
ciple core values and guarantees. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of
Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. Rrv. 1167, 1168, 1182 (1983) (constructing framework for
understanding idea of equality and its importance as norm in constitutional provi-
sions); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 247 (1983) (ar-
guing that egalitarian ideal that has evolved from colonial times to present forms
core of Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
2. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 (extending guarantees of Equal Protection
Clause to anyone, citizen or alien, subject to laws of United States and residing
within its territorial boundaries). In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court found unconsti-
tutional a California statute that discriminated against Chinese citizens. Id. at 374.
The Court based its decision on the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects all persons within the United States, regardless of citizenship or alienage.
Id. at 369.
The Yick Wo decision was the first time the Supreme Court explicitly extended
the protection of the Constitution to aliens, regardless of citizenship. See id. at 369.
Rather, the Equal Protection Clause had been viewed as a means for prohibiting
state discrimination based on race and religion, rather than citizenship. See
Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (invalidating state statute excluding
blacks from juries under Equal Protection Clause).
For the purpose of this Note, the term "resident alien," also known as "immi-
grant alien," will refer to those aliens that have been granted the right to work and
permanently reside in the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (Supp. 1993).
The Immigration and Nationality (McCarren-Walter) Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (15) (1970 & Supp. 1993), defines "documented aliens" as incorporating
2
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1900s state legislative classifications based on alienage faced only sporadic
judicial scrutiny.3 However, in the 1970s, the Supreme Court began re-
viewing state laws that discriminated against aliens and eliminating dispa-
rate statutory classifications. 4
both immigrant and non-immigrant aliens. Temporary or non-immigrant aliens
are admitted to the United States for a short duration and include such categories
as students, diplomats and tourists. See id. Nonresident aliens are those persons
who are neither citizen nor resident of the United States. BLACK's LAw DIcriONAY
731 (6th ed. 1990). The primary focus of this Note will be resident aliens and
nonresident aliens. This Note will not discuss the rights of temporary or illegal
aliens. For a case discussing the rights of illegal aliens, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982) (finding Texas statute denying enrollment of undocumented alien
children into local school districts in violation of Equal Protection Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment).
3. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 418-22 (1948)
(striking down California state statute prohibiting aliens from fishing off the Cali-
fornia coast); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915) (finding unconstitutional
state statute that required 80% of employers' workforces must be comprised of
citizens). For a discussion of Takahashi, see infra notes 51-55 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Truax, see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
Apart from the cases mentioned above, few state statutes were struck down
based on alienage. See, e.g., Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 334 (1923) (finding consti-
tutional state statute prohibiting aliens from owning land); Webb v. O'Brien, 263
U.S. 313, 324 (1923) (same); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1923)
(same); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 222, 224 (1923) (same); Heim v. Mc-
Call, 239 U.S. 175, 194 (1915) (upholding New York statute prohibiting aliens
from working on public work projects); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143-
46 (1914) (upholding Pennsylvania statute prohibiting aliens from owning fire-
arms used in game hunting); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340, 342 (1901)
(upholding California statute denying alien's right to devolution of property).
Use of the Equal Protection Clause against statutory classifications based on
alienage was limited in the 1900s due to the "public interest" doctrine. See Truax,
239 U.S. at 39-40. In Truax, the Supreme Court introduced this doctrine with the
holding that
"[t]he discrimination defined by the ... [Fourteenth Amendment] does
not pertain to the regulation or distribution of the public domain, or of
the common property or resources of the people of the State, the enjoy-
ment of which may be limited to its citizens as against both aliens and
citizens of other States."
Id. For a further discussion of the development of the "public interest" doctrine,
see infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Nyquist, 423 U.S. at 12 (holding legislative classification denying
aliens state financial assistance for higher education unconstitutional); In re Grif-
fiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (holding Connecticut's exclusion of aliens from the
practice of law in violation of Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973) (holding state legislation
prohibiting aliens from obtaining employment in civil service violative of Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 376
(1971) (applying strict judicial scrutiny to find state legislation denying welfare
benefits to resident aliens invalid under Equal Protection Clause); see also Examin-
ing Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976)
(striking down Puerto Rico statute restricting aliens from practicing engineering).
But see DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (holding states permitted to restrict
employment of illegal aliens).
Equal protection became a primary means for overturning state legislation
during the Warren Court years and has since played a large part in framing state
3
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Presently, resident aliens are classified by state and federal courts as
"discrete and insular" minorities.5 State statutes come before the Court
with a presumption of validity.6 However, when a state statute contains
legislative classifications based on alienage, it is inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny.7 Consequently, a state bears a heavy bur-
den when it classifies individuals based on their alienage.
8
laws. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT. AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
103, 179 (1970) (discussing egalitarian themes that emerged during Warren Court
years). The Supreme Court's willingness to apply a strict scrutiny standard and
eliminate state classificiions based on 'alienage seemed to arise "in response to
increasingly humanitarian sentiments-sharpened by the growing presence of
aliens in the United States-and out of a recognition that aliens are active partici-
pants in American society." Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights
of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1406 (1983) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
5. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 374. In Graham, Justice Blackmun described aliens
as a "discrete and insular" minority for whom close judicial scrutiny is appropriate.
Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938)). The Supreme Court first utilized the term "discrete and insular" minority
in extending equal protection to blacks. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
A "discrete and insular" minority is a class that lacks political representation and is,
therefore, subject to discrimination by the majority. Id.
6. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (noting that "[a] legislature must have substantial
latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the
problem perceived").
Traditionally, in the areas of economics and social welfare, states have been
permitted to apply broad legislative classifications if such classifications serve a le-
gitimate and rational purpose. Graham 403 U.S. at 371; see also Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (noiing that in area of economics and social
welfare, states do not violate Equal Protection Clause merely because classifications
made by its laws are imperfect); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28
(1961) (applying rational relationship test and upholding a Maryland statute regu-
lating commodities that may be sold on Sundays); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 489-91 (1955) (applying rational relationship test and upholding an
Oklahoma statute regulating advertising).
7. Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 721. Under close judicial scrutiny, courts indepen-
dently determine whether particular classifications are supported by a compelling
state interest, rather than defer to the decisions of other branches of government.
See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 639 (subjecting to strict scrutiny New York statute requir-
ing citizenship for civil service position); Graham 403 U.S. at 376.
State classifications that are based on alienage or citizenship, like those based
on race and nationality, face a heightened judicial solicitude and must be sup-
ported by a compelling and vital state interest. See Graham, 403 U.S. at'372. The
classifications must be narrowly tailored to further this compelling state interest.
Id. However, the Supreme Court has not applied a strict scrutiny standard when
reviewing state classifications within the political and governmental area; rather, a
rational basis standard is applied. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979);
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). For a further discussion on the "political
function" exception, see infra note 70.
8. See Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 721 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
196 (1964)). In Griffiths, the Supreme Court found that aliens as a class were in
need of protection because the class was unable to safeguard its own interests
within the political process. Id. Therefore, the Court applied close judicial scru-
tiny when reviewing the particular state classification based on alienage. Id.
[Vol. 39: p. 705
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While the power of a state to enforce laws that discriminate based on
alienage is very narrow, a majority of state courts have interpreted the
equal protection clause to permit alienage classifications within workers'
compensation statutes.9 States disagree as to whether workers' compensa-
tion classifications that substantially limit the amount of death benefits
awarded to nonresident alien dependents are in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.' 0 Some that find the classifications constitutional be-
lieve that nonresident alien dependents are not protected persons under
the Constitution, and therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
serve as a guarantee of equal death benefits.'1 Those few states that find
9. See Metti v. George K., Mackie Fuel Co., 197 P. 881, 883 (Kan. 192i) (find-
ing state provision distinguishing between resident citizen and resident alien re-
pugnant to Fourteenth Amendment and denial of equal protection). Presently,
the distinction between alien and citizen does not affect an individual employee's
rights under state workmen's compensation statutes. However, the majority of
state workmen's compensation statutes contain classifications based on the alien-
age of an employee's dependents. See 2 ARTHUR LARsON, WORKMEN's COMPENSA-
TION LAW § 63.50 (1992). States limit or deny workers' compensation death
benefit awards on the basis of these alienage classifications. Id. For a further dis-
cussion of the constitutionality of state workmen's compensation statutes contain-
ing alienage classifications, see infra note 10.
Those states precluding nonresident alien dependents from receiving benefits
are: (1) New Mexico-see Pedrazza v. Sid Fleming Contractor, Inc., 607 P.2d 597,
599-600 (N.M. 1980) (holding that New Mexico's workmen's compensation statute
bars benefits to dependents who are nonresident aliens at time of employee's
death); (2) West Virginia-see Micaz v. Compensation Comm'r, 13 S.E.2d 161 (W.
Va. 1941) (same); (3) Hawaii-see Peregrina Lumang Gambalan v. Kekaha Sugar
Co., 39 Haw. 258, 262 (1952) (same); and (4) Pennsylvania-see Liberato v. Royer
& Herr, 28 Pa. Dist. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1926) (same).
A majority of the remaining states substantially reduce benefits. See, e.g.,
(1) Utah-Alvarez Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416 (Utah 1986) (not-
ing Utah Workmen's Compensation Act provides "[w] hen any alien dependent of
the deceased resides outside of the United States... such dependent shall be paid
not to exceed one-half the amount provided herein"); (2) New York-
Skarpeletzos v. Counes & Raptis Corp., 126 N.E. 268 (N.Y. 1920) (same); Casella v.
McCormick, 180 A.D. 94, 95-96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917) (same); (3) Georgia-Barge-
Wagener Co. v. Morales, 429 S.E.2d 671 (Ga.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993)
(same); and (4) Ohio-State ex rel. Papado Poulos v. Industrial Comm'n, 196 N.E.
780 (Ohio 1935) (same).
10. For a discussion of the disagreement among states on the constitutionality
of disparate death benefits awards, see infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of a state
workers' compensation statute that expressly provided for equal benefits for citi-
zens and nonresident alien dependents alike. Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499 (1923). For a further discussion of the Supreme
Court's rationale in Madera, see infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
11. SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (espousing principle
that "in extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has
been at pains to point out that it was the alien's presence within the territorial
jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act"). States that uphold the constitu-
tionality of disparate workmen's compensation statutes rely on principles first in-
troduced by the Supreme Court in Johnson. SeeJalifi v. Industrial Comm'n, 644
P.2d 1319 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (upholding Arizona statute denying nonresident alien
dependents death benefits), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 899 (1982); Pedrazza v. Sid
1994]
5
Shannon: Jurado v. Popejoy Construction Co.: Determining the Constitutiona
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the statutory classifications unconstitutional characterize the laws as alien-
age classifications that discriminate against the resident worker. 12 In strik-
ing down the statutes, these states utilize the strict scrutiny standard.' 3
In Jurado v. Popejoy Construction Co., 14 the Kansas Supreme Court held
that the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act,15 providing disparate
death benefits to nonresident alien dependents, violated the equal protec-
tion clauses of the state and federal constitutions.' 6 The Jurado court de-
termined that the right to workers' compensation death benefits involved
a consideration of the constitutional rights of the worker, rather than
those of his or her dependents. 7 Based on this premise, the Jurado court
found that the statute's disparate treatment of employees with nonresi-
dent dependents was based on alienage and, therefore, subject to strict
scrutiny.' 8 The court in Jurado found that the reason advanced by the
Fleming Contractor, Inc., 607 P.2d 597 (N.M. 1980) (upholding New Mexico stat-
ute denying nonresident alien dependents death benefits); Alvarez Martinez v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416 (Utah 1988) (upholding statute reducing death
benefits to nonresident alien dependents by one-half ). For a further discussion
of Johnson, see infra note 77.
12. See, e.g., De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204,
206-07 (Fla. 1989) (finding constitutionality of Florida Workman's Compensation
Act was based on rights of resident worker and not rights of nonresident alien
dependents); Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669, 678 (Kan. 1993) (con-
sidering constitutional rights of alien worker rather than rights of dependent non-
resident aliens). For a further discussion of the constitutional rights of employees
to death benefits, see infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the De Ayala decision and the role it played in shaping subsequent state deci-
sions on this issue, see infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 204; Jurado, 853 P.2d at 676. Both the
Jurado and De Ayala, courts applied a strict scrutiny standard because the respective
statutory classifications were based on alienage. Id. For a general discussion of
equal protection standards, see infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
14. 853 P.2d 660 (Kan. 1993).
15. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510b(i) (Supp. 1993). This provision limits the
death benefits awarded to nonresident alien dependents to $750, while permitting
all other dependents to recover up to $200,000. Id.
16. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 677 (citing U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; KAN. STAT. ANN.
CONST. Biue OF RIGHTS, § 1.)
17. Id. at 678. For a discussion of the analysis utilized by the Jurado court in
reaching this determination, see infra notes 133-64, 177-89. The court recognized
that the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510b(i)
(Supp. 1993), created a separate right of action in the dependents when the
worker dies. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 674. However, the employment relationship was
the source of workers' compensation liability and any right of action of the depen-
dents arose out of the contract between them. Id. at 674-75. For a further discus-
sion of the court's review of workmen's compensation and a workers' right to
death benefits, see infra notes 141-43. For a discussion of the Florida Supreme
Court's determination in De Ayala, see infra notes 97-104. For a discussion of con-
trary state conclusions on right to death benefits, see infra note 81.
18. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 675-77. The Jurado court introduced the three basic
standards the Supreme Court has used in determining whether a legislative classifi-
cation violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and dis-
cussed the requirements necessary for proving constitutionality under each
standard. Id. at 675-76.
[Vol. 39: p. 705
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State for maintaining the classification based on alienage did not justify
the statute's disparate treatment, as the State did not establish that the
classifications served a compelling state interest.' 9 Accordingly, the Kan-
sas Supreme Court held that the statute's disparate treatment of employ-
ees with nonresident dependents was unconstitutional.2 0 This recent
decision provides a compelling analysis of the constitutionality of workers'
compensation statutes and establishes a framework for analyzing the alien-
age classifications within the context of the Equal Protection Clause.2 1
This Note will examine the rationale behind the Jurado decision and
its impact on the elimination of disparate legislative classifications based
on alienage.2 2 Part II of this Note will trace the development of the equal
protection of aliens from the early Supreme Court decisions recognizing
aliens as "persons," until the present use of the strict scrutiny standard for
statutory classifications based on alienage.23 Further, Part II will evaluate
the historical precedent and legal support that led the Kansas Supreme
Court to conclude that receipt of workers' compensation death benefits is
a right that belongs to the worker and to his or her dependents. 24 Part III
19. Id. at 677.
20. Id. at 678. Before concluding, the Jurado court identified four other juris-
dictions that have addressed the constitutionality of statutes limiting death benefits
of nonresident alien dependents, and the different legal conclusions drawn by
those jurisdictions determining that the statutes were constitutional. Id. For a
further discussion of the Jurado court's rationale, see infra notes 131-76 and accom-
panying text.
21. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court recognized the invidious discrimination
resulting from workmen's compensation statutes that preclude or substantially
limit the death benefits awarded to nonresident dependents. See id.
22. In Jurado, the Kansas Supreme Court conducted an in-depth analysis of
the purpose of workmen's compensation benefits and the specific rights created
under those statutes. Id. at 672-74. After concluding that the state statute did dis-
criminate based on alienage, the Jurado court applied equal protection principles
to determine the constitutionality of the classifications. Id. at 675-77. For a discus-
sion of the rationale applied by the Jurado court, see infra notes 131-76 and accom-
panying text. For a critical analysis of the Jurado rationale, see infra notes 177-89
and accompanying text.
23. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). To fully
understand the legal framework that supported the Kansas Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Jurado, there must be a basic understanding of equal protection principles
and the Supreme Court's use of these principles as a weapon against state discrimi-
nation. Thus, this section will trace the historical development of equal protection
of aliens through the judicial elimination of statutory classifications based on alien-
age. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (finding that strict
scrutiny is proper standard for classification based on alienage); Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (extending equal protection to aliens). For a discus-
sion of these cases, see infra notes 37-42, 56-70 and accompanying text.
24. The Jurado court reached its unprecedented decision by building upon
principles established by the Supreme Court in Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission, 262 U.S. 499 (1923), and several prior Kansas Supreme
Court decisions. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 674-78. This section will review the principal
cases that influenced the Jurado court in its decision to strike down the Kansas
Workmen's Compensation Statute. Additionally, this section will summarize Kan-
sas precedent defining the employee's rights under the Kansas Workmen's Corn-
19941 NOTrE
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will provide a case discussion of Jurado. Part V of this Note will then criti-
cally analyze the Jurado decision. Finally, Part V will examine the impact
that the Jurado decision has on the ever-increasing alien population and
the distinct need for the Supreme Court to decide whether these statutes
are constitutional in light of the Federal Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause. 25
II. BACKGROUND
A. Equal Protection Review
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike," and any unjust denial of equal treat-
ment is cause for judicial review. 26 The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that the operation of government requires the use of some
legislative classifications.2 7 Neither the federal nor state Equal Protection
Clauses prohibit the use of legislatively-created classifications.28 However,
these clauses do require that such classifications are not based on imper-
missible criteria or arbitrarily used to discriminate against a particular
group of individuals. 29
To determine whether a legislative classification violates the right to
equal protection of the law, the Supreme Court has established three clas-
sifications: (1) the traditional rational basis test; (2) the substantial rela-
tionship (or heightened scrutiny) test; and (3) the strict scrutiny (or
compelling interest) test.30 The Supreme Court applies the rational basis
pensation Statute. This precedent supports the Jurado court's main premise that
death benefits represent a constitutional right of the employee.
25. The Jurado decision plays an important role in recognizing the rights of
individuals who leave their families behind and come to the United States hoping
to provide a better life for themselves and their dependents. For a further discus-
sion of the impact of Jurado and the need for a consistent approach to determining
the constitutionality of disparate workmen's compensation statutes, see infra notes
190-98 and accompanying text.
26. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (finding that concept of equal
protection "emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individ-
uals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable").
27. Graham, 403 U.S. at 371 (noting that "a state retains broad discretion to
classify").
28. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). In Plyler, the Supreme Court
emphasized the need for state legislatures to
have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approxi-
mate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing
concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the
practical ability of the State to remedy every ill. In applying the Equal
Protection Clause to most forms of state action, we thus seek only the
assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a
legitimate public purpose.
Id.
29. Id. at 216-17.
30. Graham, 403 U.S. at 371; see aloJurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d
660, 675 (Kan. 1993). See generally NowAK, supra note 1, at 570 (discussing equal
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test to those classifications that do not implicate fundamental rights or
suspect classes of persons (such as race, national origin, gender or illegiti-
macy).31 Under the rational basis test, a legislative classification must be
rationally related to serving any legitimate governmental interest.3 2 Gen-
erally, courts will apply a rational basis test when the equal protection chal-
lenge is directed against social or economic legislation.3 3 In these areas,
judicial deference is the norm as courts generally defer to legislative judg-
ment and require only that the state statutes are neither arbitrary nor
irrational.3 4
Heightened scrutiny requires that the legislative objective of a particu-
lar statutory classification be substantially related to the furthering of im-
portant governmental interests.3 5 The Supreme Court has applied
heightened scrutiny to equal protection challenges that are directed at
classifications based on gender or child legitimacy.3 6
The third, and most strict, level of scrutiny protects persons from gov-
ernmental action that employs a "suspect classification," intentionally dis-
criminating against a protected class, or burdens the free exercise of a
fundamental right.3 7 Under strict scrutiny, in order for the government
tojustify a classification aimed directly at a "suspect class" it must show that
the classification was necessary to further a compelling governmental in-
protection analysis and Supreme Court's use of rational basis, heightened scrutiny
and strict scrutiny standards).
31. See BARRON, supra note 1, at 551-63.
32. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983).
33. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (apply-
ing rational basis to uphold state statute regulating advertising).
34. SeeLindsleyv. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). In Linds-
ley, the Court states:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and is
therefore purely arbitrary.
Id. The party challenging the governmental classification bears the burden of
proving that the classification serves no rational or reasonable purpose. Id.
35. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-90 (1973) (applying height-
ened scrutiny to find federal statute requiring servicewomen to show greater proof
of dependency than servicemen in violation of Equal Protection Clause).
36. See, e.g., Pickett, 462 U.S. at 8 (applying heightened scrutiny to classifica-
tion based on legitimacy); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688-90 (applying heightened scru-
tiny to classification based on gender); see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(subjecting state legislature's classification that preferred men over women in ad-
ministration of estates to heightened scrutiny review).
37. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); see, e.g., Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down state law
which discriminated against Mexican-Americans with respect to jury service); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303, 310
(1879) (holding law which forbid blacks from serving on grand juries violates
equal protection guarantees).
1994] NOTE
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terest.38 The government has the burden of proving: (1) the classifica-
tion serves a compelling government interest; and (2) the legislative
classification is narrowly tailored to further that compelling interest.3 9
Although state legislation enacted to serve a legitimate government inter-
est is normally reviewed with a presumption of constitutionality, a statutory
classification aimed at a "discrete and insular minority" is inherently sus-
pect, and the burden of proving its constitutionality shifts to the "propo-
nent of the statute." 4°
B. Aliens as a Suspect Class
In 1886, the Supreme Court, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,41 recognized that
"all persons" residing within the United States, regardless of alienage, were
guaranteed equal protection of state laws and, thus, protected from state
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 After deciding Yick
Wo, the Supreme Court utilized the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate
state legislation that discriminated against aliens.43
During the early 1900s, however, the Supreme Court engaged in a
less stringent review of state legislation that favored citizens over aliens in
the regulation and distribution of state property and economic re-
38. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 376; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
634 (1969) (finding use of strict scrutiny appropriate standard for reviewing state
classification based on residency).
39. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973) (holding classification based
on alienage must be narrowly tailored and not over or under inclusive). See gener-
ally NowAK, supra note 1, at 571 (discussing narrowly tailored prong of strict scru-
tiny standard). The state law can be under-inclusive in that it classifies too small a
number of persons and excludes others who possess characteristics that would fur-
ther the purpose of the statute. Id. Over-inclusiveness results when the classifica-
tion includes individuals that do not possess the characteristics that are necessary
to further the purpose of the statute. Id.
40. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added)).
41. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
42. Id. at 369. In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court recognized that aliens lawfully
admitted to the United States were protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. Accordingly, the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the oper-
ation of laundries from wood buildings because the ordinance had a discrimina-
tory impact on Chinese owners of laundromats. Id. at 373. At the time the
municipal ordinance was adopted, the majority of laundromats having wooded
buildings were owned and operated by Chinese immigrants. Id.
Ten years after the Supreme Court extended Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tion to aliens, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
protected aliens within the federal context. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
43. See Truax v. Raich 239 U.S. 33, 39-43 (1915) (holding unconstitutional
Arizona statute that required 80% of employers' workforces to be comprised of
citizens). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1415-18. But see Ohio
ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396 (1927) (finding valid under Equal
Protection Clause city ordinance prohibiting issuance of licenses to operate pool
rooms to aliens).
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sources.4 The Courtjustified this deferential review of state alienage clas-
sifications on the "public interest" doctrine.45 This doctrine stagnated the
progress of alien rights throughout the 1900s.4 In fact, Truax v. Raich4 7
was the only early case where the Supreme Court struck down a state stat-
ute that discriminated against aliens.48 In Truax, an Arizona statute re-
quired that eighty percent of the workforces of both public and private
employers be comprised of citizens, rather than aliens.49 Arizona failed to
establish that the statute served a "special public interest." Therefore, the
Supreme Court found that the statute violated the equal protection rights
of the alien population within the state.50
It was not until thirty years after Truax that the Supreme Court once
again utilized the Equal Protection Clause to protect aliens from state dis-
crimination. 51 In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,5 2 the Supreme
Court rejected the state's argument that the preservation and conservation
of fish was a compelling state interest.53 The state's interest in prohibiting
aliens from fishing off its shores did not justify the statute's discriminatory
treatment of nonresidents. 5 4 Accordingly, the Court held that the statute
impermissibly discriminated against aliens and, therefore, was
unconstitutional. 55
44. See Truax 239 U.S. at 39-40 (noting that regulation of public domain lim-
ited to citizens not aliens).
45. The "public interest" doctrine applied to state statutes that prohibited
aliens from owning land, acquiring firearms for hunting purposes and working on
public projects. See Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 334 (1923) (upholding constitu-
tionality of state legislation that restricted aliens from owning or acquiring land);
Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 198 (1915) (holding state regulations that pro-
hibited aliens from working on state public work project constitutional); Patsone v.
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143-46 (1914) (finding state measures that prohibit
aliens from owning fire arms did not violate Equal Protection Clause). See Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1401-03.
46. See Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1401-03.
47. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
48. Id. at 39-43.
49. Id. at 35.
50. Id. at 41-43. In Truax, the Supreme Court recognized that the state had
an interest in saving its public resources but found that the state could not deny,
on the basis of citizenship, the right to work in community occupations. Id. at 41.
Although legitimate, the Court found that the state's interest in protecting citizens
from competition for employment was not sufficient to sustain the disparate statu-
tory treatment. Id.
51. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 418-22 (1948) (us-
ing Equal. Protection Clause to strike down statutory classification based on
alienage).
52. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
53. Id. at 418-20. In Takahashi, the Supreme Court did not specifically reject
the public interest doctrine; rather, the Court found that California's interest in
protecting its ownership of fish three miles off its coast was not sufficient to justify
barring aliens from becoming fishermen. Id. at 422.
54. Id. at 418-20.
.55. Id. at 420-22. The concurrence in Takahashi argued that the statute
should be held unconstitutional because it directly targeted Japanese aliens be-
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. Although the Supreme Court had previously struck down state legisla-
tion in the context of the Equal Protection Clause, it was not until 1971
that it extended full protection to aliens and applied the strict scrutiny test
to determine the constitutionality of statutes which discriminate against
nonresidents. 5 6  In Graham v. Richardson,5 7 the Supreme Court recog-
nized aliens as a "discrete and insular minority."58 Under review in Gra-
ham were Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes conditioning welfare benefits
on citizen status or residency within the United States for a specified pe-
riod of time.59 These disparate state statutes were challenged on the basis
that they violated the equal protection rights of nonresident aliens. 60 Jux-
taposing, the states argued that the statutory classifications were consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause because the state had a right to favor
United States citizens over aliens in distributing limited state resources
such as welfare benefits. 6 1 Thus, the states sought to employ the "special
public interest" doctrine that had been a successful defense in prior equal
protection challenges.62 The Supreme Court rejected the special public
cause of the anti-Japanese fever which existed at the time. Id. at 422 (Murphy, J.,
concurring).
56. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (finding alienage clas-
sifications as inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny).
57. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
58. Id. at 371-72.
59. Id. at 366-68. The Arizona statute restricted welfare benefits to citizens or
aliens residing within the United States for fifteen years. Id. at 367. The Penn-
sylvania statute excluded aliens from receiving welfare benefits altogether. Id. at
368.
60. Id. at 366.
61. Id. at 370. The states claimed that the statutory "distinction involve[d] no
'invidious discrimination' . . . for the State is not discriminating with respect to
race or nationality." Id. at 370-71.
62. Id. at 372. The states' attempt to utilize the "special public interest" doc-
trine forced the Supreme Court to evaluate its prior decisions that had accepted
this doctrine as a limitation on alien rights. Id. at 372-76. See Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33 (1915) (establishing "public interest" doctrine); Crane v. New York, 239
U.S. 195, aff'g People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427 (1915). For a further discussion of
the "public interest" doctrine, see supra notes 44-50. In Crane, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the decision by the New York Court of Appeals uphold-
ing a New York statute that prohibited employers from hiring aliens on public
work projects. Crane, 108 N.E. at 427, 430. In the New York court's decision, Jus-
tice Cardoza espoused the well-known observation:
To disqualify aliens is discrimination, indeed' but not arbitrary discrimi-
nation; for the principle of exclusion is the restriction of the resources of
the state to the advancement and profit of the members of the state. Un-
generous and unwise such discrimination may be. It is not for that rea-
son unlawful .... Whatever is a privilege, rather than a right, may be
made dependent upon citizenship. In its war against poverty, the state is
not required to dedicate its own resources to citizens and aliens alike.
Id. at 429-30.
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interest doctrine, finding that it was based on a right-privilege distinction
that had since been rejected by the Court.63
The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, held that the spe-
cial public interest doctrine was inadequate to justify discrimination.6 Ac-
cordingly, rather than applying traditional equal protection principles, the
Supreme Court applied close judicial scrutiny.65 The Court found that
statutory classifications based on alienage were subject to a strict scrutiny
standard.66 Because the states were unable to establish the requisite com-
pelling interest that would satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, the Court struck down both the Pennsylvania and Arizona statutes as
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 67
After Graham, the strict scrutiny test became the accepted standard
applied in judicial review of state statutory classifications based on alien-
age. 68 Under this standard, the Court furthered the protection of alien
63. Graham, 403 U.S. at 374. The "right-privilege" doctrine was based on the
principle that constitutional limits on discrimination applied only to those benefits
characterized as "rights" rather than "privileges." Id. In the years since the intro-
duction of the "special public interest" doctrine, the right-privilege distinction had
been replaced, thus bringing the Equal Protection Clause into the realm of legisla-
tion which denies benefits to aliens. See Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at
1415-18.
64. Graham, 403 U.S. at 374. Moreover, Justice Blackmun further noted that:
[The] justification of limiting expenses is particularly inappropriate and
unreasonable when the discriminated class consists of aliens. Aliens like
citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces .... [A]liens
may live within a state for many years, work in the state and contribute to
the economic growth of the state.
Id. at 376 (quoting Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250, 253 (E.D. Pa. 1970)). Justice
Blackmun concluded that " [t] here can be no 'special public interest' in tax reve-
nues to which aliens have contributed on an equal basis with the residence [sic] of
the State." Id.
65. Id. at 371-72. The Supreme Court looked to its prior decision in
Takahashi for support in concluding that classifications based on alienage are in-
herently suspect, and thus, "the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its
alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits." Id. at 372 (quoting
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 376.
68. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S* 1, 7, 12 (applying strict scrutiny stan-
dard to find unconstitutional statute which barred aliens from receiving state fi-
nancial assistance in obtaining higher education), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Rabinovitch v. Nyquist, 433 U.S. 901 (1977); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721, 729
(1973) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down state statute prohibiting aliens from
practicing law); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642-43 (1973) (applying strict
scrutiny to invalidate statute preventing aliens from participating in competitive
civil service using strict scrutiny standard).
Soon after Graham, however, the Supreme Court began to retreat from the use
of strict scrutiny in areas related to government and politics. See Developments in the
Law, supra note 4, at 1415-18. In Foley v. Conneliej 435 U.S. 291, 295-97 (1978),
and Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979), the Supreme Court explicitly held
that the right to participate in government was a privilege for citizens, and thus, a
"political community" exception to treating aliens as a suspect class would apply.
In Foley, the Court utilized a rational basis standard to uphold a New York statute
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rights in social and economic areas by strictly scrutinizing discriminatory
state statutes.6 9 Viewing legal aliens as a "suspect" class under the Equal
Protection Clause protected them from the inherent prejudice existing
within discriminatory state legislation. 70
C. Wor*ers' Compensation Death Benefits
The development of state workers' compensation jurisprudence par-
alleled the evolution of the Supreme Court's equal protection jurispru-
that excluded aliens from the state police force. Foley, 435 U.S. at 296, 300. Subse-
quently, the Ambach Court embraced the use of this lower standard and applied it
to another New York statute which excluded resident aliens from teaching in pub-
lic school if they did not declare the intent to become citizens. Ambach, 441 U.S. at
80; see also Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647-49 (stating, in dictum, that statutory classifica-
tions concerning voting and public office are not subject to strict scrutiny).
69. See Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1407.
70. See id. Constitutional commentators believe that when a class is viewed as
"suspect," the propriety of applying "strict scrutiny" to legislative classifications
aimed at that class involves the consideration of three factors: (1) whether the
statute prohibits the suspect class from participating in the political process;
(2) whether the particular class affected has traditionally been faced with societal
hostility and has thus been prevented from forming political groups; and
(3) whether even for those groups that do not face direct severe prejudice, strict
scrutiny is appropriate when the class has been subjected to societal misconcep-
tions and stereotyping which result in unfair legislative treatment. Id.; see also,
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 76-77, 86-87, 151-53 (1980) (arguing
aliens are "discrete and insular" minority in need of close judicial scrutiny). See
generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-22, at 1053
(1978) (same); Elizabeth Hull, Resident Aliens and the Equal Protection Clause: The
Burger Court's Retreat from Graham v. Richardson, 47 BROOK. L. REv. 1516, 1528
(1979) (discussing lower standard of review in political and governmental areas).
Although the Supreme Court retreated from the use of "strict scrutiny" on legisla-
tion linked to the governmental process, it has not done so for other state legisla-
tion that pertains to economic and social participation. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 224, 230 (1982) (utilizing strict scrutiny in reviewing Texas statutory classifica-
tion that prohibited illegal aliens from receiving public education and finding that
classification violated Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). Sev-
eral commentators have noted that the exclusion of aliens from participation in
governmental and legislative processes increases the need for strict scrutiny of
other state statutory classifications based on alienage. See, e.g., ELY, supra, at 150-
51; TRIBE, supra, at 1053-54.
Federal equal protection of aliens has undergone a different history than state
equal protection of aliens. The Fifth Amendment is used to regulate federal ac-
tion that discriminates against aliens. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228, 238 (1896); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam) (hold-
ing limits within Fifth Amendment are consistent with limits imposed on state ac-
tion under Fourteenth Amendment); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)
(same). However, federal action discriminating against aliens is reviewed less
strictly. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of
federal statute excluding aliens from receiving Medicare benefits by applying "ra-
tional basis" test, instead of strict scrutiny standard). For a general discussion of
the dual standard applied to federal and state actions, see Note, A Dual Standard for
State Discrimination Against Aliens, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1516 (1979).
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dence.7 1 In the early 1900s, state workers' compensation statutes were
adopted in order to limit the liability of employers within hazardous occu-
pations.72 Under these statutes, employees relinquish their right to seek
recovery against the employer in exchange for the employer's full accept-
ance of liability for all work-related injuries.73 All benefits awarded to em-
ployees, however, are subject to the special rules specified within state
workers' compensation statutes.7 4
One such rule that many states include within their workers' compen-
sation statutes is a substantial limitation or denial of death benefits for
those employees having dependents residing outside of the territorial lim-
its of the United States. 75 A majority of these statutes have survived equal
protection challenges on the basis that the reviewing courts view workers'
compensation death benefits as a right of the dependents, not the de-
ceased employee. 76 The rationale behind this limitation of death benefits
is that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment does not extend to persons outside of the territorial
boundaries of the United States. 77 Therefore, nonresidents are not enti-
71. See, e.g., Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922) (upholding exten-
sion of New York Workmen's Compensation Act to businesses employing four or
more workers); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (same,
involving Washington state statute); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,
208 (1917) (upholding New York Workmen's Compensation Statute); Arizona
Cooper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400, 430-31 (1908) (upholding Arizona's Em-
ployers' Liability Law). The state workers' compensation acts were sustained in
their entirety by the Supreme Court. See Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 502 (1923).
72. Madera, 262 U.S. at 500-01. The Court upheld the constitutionality of
these workers' compensation acts, which established rules governing the liabilities
of an employer to the employee with respect to compensation for the employee's
work-related injuries. Id. at 501.
73. Id.
74. LARSON, supra note 9, § 63.40-50.
75. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1046(C) (1984); FLA. STAT. ch.
440.16(7) (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510b(i) (1992).
The United States has entered into a number of treaties with foreign coun-
tries in order to guarantee that nonresident alien workers and their dependents
are afforded the same rights and privileges as citizens: Germany (1923); Hungary
(1925); Austria (1928); China (1946); and Italy (1949). LARSON, supra note 9,
§ 63.52. See generally Mizugami v. Sharin West Overseas Inc., 615 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y.
1993) (finding treaty with Japan preempted state limitation of benefits for nonresi-
dent Japanese dependents).
76. See LARSON, supra note 9, § 64.11. For a discussion of state cases in which
workmen's compensation statutes that limit death benefits for nonresident alien
dependents have been upheld as constitutional, seeJalifi v. Industrial Commission,
644 P.2d 1319 (Ariz. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 899 (1982); Barge-Wag-
ener Constr. v. Morales, 429 S.E.2d 671 (Ga.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993).
But see De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 207-08
(Fla. 1989) (finding statute limiting death benefits to nonresident alien depen-
dents unconstitutional).
77. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950). In Johnson, the
Supreme Court expounded the principle that the rights of individuals outside of
the territorial bounds of the United States are not protected by the Constitution.
19941 NOTE
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tied to receive the same treatment and benefits as those received by citi-
zens. 78 Even though the statutes are found to be discriminatory, a
majority of state courts have upheld them on the basis that death benefits
are the right of dependents, and therefore, as nonresidents of the United
States, these dependents are not entitled to constitutional protection. 79
While few states have struck down disparate workers' compensation
statutes, these states reason that death benefits were, in fact, the constitu-
tional right of the employee, not the dependents.80 The critical conflict
among the states stems from their varying interpretations of the rights cre-
ated under state workers' compensation statutes.81 Specifically, this disa-
See Johnson, 339 U.S. at 771. Justice Jackson, writing for the Johnson majority, em-
phasized that "the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the alien's
presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act." Id.
Relying on this principle, the Court then considered the right of enemy aliens to
command access to the courts of the United States when captured and imprisoned
abroad. Id. For a further discussion of nonresident, enemy aliens, see cases col-
lected in Annotations, 137 A.L.R. 1335, 1355 (1942). See also George G. Battle,
Enemy Litigants in Our Courts, 28 VA. L. REv. 429 (1942); Edwin M. Borchard, The
Right of Alien Enemies to Sue in Our Courts, 27 YAE L.J. 104 (1917); Jacob J. Gordon,
The Right of Alien Enemies to Sue in Our American Courts, 36 ILL. L. REv. 809, 810
(1942); Willie Yates, Enemy Aliens as Litigants, 12 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 55, 65 (1943).
78. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 775.
79. States that have upheld the constitutionality of statutes limiting benefits to
nonresident alien dependents are Arizona, New Mexico and Utah. See Pena v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 683 P.2d 309, 314-15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Pedrazza v. Sid Flem-
ing Contractor, Inc., 607 P.2d 597, 601 (N.M. 1980); Alvarez Martinez v. Industrial
Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 1986).
In Pena, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily ruled that the state statute,
which reduced the death benefits of nonresident alien dependents was constitu-
tional. Pena, 683 P.2d at 314-15. The decision was based on a consideration of the
rights of the dependents, who as aliens, were found to be unprotected by the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Similarly, in Pedrazza, the Supreme Court of New Mexico also upheld the con-
stitutionality of a statute which excluded aliens from receiving death benefits.
Pedrazza, 607 P.2d at 601. The Pedrazza, court also concluded that the right of
equal protection extended only to people within the geographic boundaries of the
state. Id. at 678; see also LmSON, supra note 9, §§ 63.50-.53.In Alvarez, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a statute that limited the death
benefiis awarded to nonresident aliens' dependents to one-half that awarded to
citizens. Alvarez, 720 P.2d at 419. The Alvarez court based its decision on the prem-
ise that workmen's compensation benefits are the right of the dependents. Id. at
417. Therefore, because the alien dependents have no constitutional rights, they
are not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and not entitled to equal bene-
fits. Id. at 418-19.
80. The only two states which have specifically struck down disparate work-
men's compensation statutes are Florida and Kansas. See De Ayala v. Florida Farm
Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 3 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989);Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co.,
853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993). But see Pena, 683 P.2d at 315 (citing Castillo v. Industrial
Commission, 520 P.2d 1142 (Ariz. 1974)); Pedrazza, 607 P.2d at 600-01; Alvarez, 720
P.2d at 417-18.
81. Most states agree that dependents' rights to death benefits stem from
their respective workmen's compensation statutes. Moeser v. Shunk, 226 P. 784
(Kan. 1924). Generally, most states find their statutes create a separate right to
death benefits for dependents, a right which is distinct from an employee's right to
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greement centers around whether a dependent's right to death benefits is
derived from the rights of the employee, or whether it is solely independ-
ent from the rights of the employee.8 2 Those states which have held that
death benefits are an independent right of dependents find that these
benefits are created directly by statute and are not derived from the em-
ployee.8 3 Alternatively, the few states that recognize the employee's right
to death benefits conclude that death benefits are derivative from the em-
ployee's rights under the employment contract and the, applicable state
workers' compensation statute.
84
1. Supreme Court's View of Workers' Compensation Death Benefits
As early as 1923, the United States Supreme Court upheld'a Califor-
nia workers' compensation statute that specifically included nonresident
aliens in provisions for awarding death benefits.8 5 In Madera Sugar Pine
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, the statute was challenged on' the basis
that it deprived employers of property without due process, in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The challenger,'Madera Sugar Pine Co.,
benefits for an injury. See Routh v. List & Weatherby Constr. Co., 257 P. 721, 722,
724 (Kan. 1927) (holding Kansas law controlling at time of employee's death gov-
erns dependents' rights to death benefits because rights are separate and in-
dependent from employee's); Schwartz v. Talmo, 205 N.W.2d 318, 321-22 (Minn.)
(holding daim of widow for death benefits was separate and distinct from 'claim of
deceased employee and, therefore, law in effect at time of employee's death bar-
ring benefits was applicable), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 803 (1973). But see Anton-
nucci v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 576 A.2d 401, 403-07 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1990) (implicitly rejecting principle that death benefits are separate from em-
ployee's rights), appeal denied, 593 A.2d 423 (Pa. 1991). The dependents' right to
death benefits vests at the death of the worker. See Baker v. List, 563 P.2d 431
(Kan. 1977); Lyon v. Wilson, 443 P.2d 314 (Kan. 1968). For a general discussion of
different interpretations of rights under various states' statutes, see LARSON, supra
note 9, §§ 63.50-.53.
82. See LARSON, supra note 9, § 64.00.
83. See International Mercantile Marine Co. v. Lowe, 93 F.2d 663, 664-65 (2d
Cir.) (finding dependent's right to death'benefits not derived from rights of de-
ceased employee but rather created directly by statute), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 565
(1938); Freeman Decorating Co. v.'Subsequent Injury Trust Fund, 333 S.E.2d 204,
206 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Haco Drilling Co. v. Hammer, 426 P.2d 689, 693
(Okla. 1967) (same). For further case law supporting this principle, see LARSON,
supra note 9, § 64.00.
84. See Sumner v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 534, 537-38
(Cal. 1983) (holding employee may release dependents' rights to death benefits,
thus implicitly establishing that dependents' rights are derived from employee's
rights); see also LARSON, supra note 9, § 64.11.
85. Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 500
(1921).86. Id. In Madera, the Madera Sugar Pine Company was required under the
statute to pay death benefits to the nonresident alien dependents of two employ-
ees, killed in the course of employment. Madera, 262 U.S. at 500. Subsequently,
the Company filed a petition for review of the awards, which was ultimately denied
by the Supreme Court of California. Id. Upon appeal by the' Company, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorai. Id.
NOTE
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contended that the statute was unconstitutional because it required em-
ployers to pay equal death benefits to nonresident alien dependents, as
well as citizens.8 7 Although the Supreme Court did not uphold the stat-
ute on an equal protection basis, Madera is an important decision because
the Court specifically recognized that workers' compensation death bene-
fits are just that, benefits for the workers.8 8 Death benefits accrue in order
to provide for, the workers' families in cases of work-related deaths.8 9
Moreover, the Court noted that workers' compensation benefits that arise
out of the relationship between the employee and employer universally act
to compensate both the injured employee and the employee's depen-
dents.90 The Madera Court stated that "[tihe object of such acts 'is sin-
gle-to provide for the liability of an employer to make compensation for
injuries received by an employee, whether to the employee himself or to
those who suffer pecuniary loss by reason of his death.' "91
In Madera, the Supreme Court found that the purpose of the workers'
compensation scheme that arises out of the employer-employee contract is
to financially provide for the employee when work-related injury destroys
the employee's earning power.92 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
state workers' compensation acts "entail[ ] upon the employer certain re-
sponsibilities toward the persons performing the labor and those depen-
dent on them, [and] there is no constitutional provision requiring that
the benefits of such legislative scheme be limited to citizens or residents of
the State."93 This rationale is consistent with the purpose of providing
87. Id. The Company argued that the statute was not a permissible exercise of
police power of the State because it required the payment of death benefits to
foreign dependents in absence of legal fault or wrong by the employer. Id. The
Company contended that, while an employer may be legally compelled to pay resi-
dent dependents upon the accidental death of an employee, on the grounds that
the State is highly interested in preventing resident dependents from becoming
public charges, this justification does not exist in the case of foreign dependents.
Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 156 P. 491 (Cal. 1916));
see also Lyon v. Wilson, 443 P.2d 314 (Kan. 1968) (holding workmen's compensa-
tion benefits to be contractual in nature); Moeser v. Shunk, 226 P. 784 (Kan. 1924)
(same).
91. Madera, 262 U.S. at 501 (quoting Huyett v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 92 A.
58, 59 (1914)).
92. Id. at 502. To establish that compensation to dependents is merely one
aspect of a compensation scheme, the Court cited several cases in which workers'
compensation acts were upheld in their entirety. Id.
93. Id. at 503 (citing Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 156 P. 495, 499
(Cal. 1916)). The Court went on to equate accident insurance to death benefits:
Just as accident insurance goes to the beneficiary regardless of his resi-
dence, so the quasi-insurance of a workers' compensation act goes to
those to whom the employee would naturally have made such insurance
payable: to himself, although an alien, if he be disabled; and to those
dependent upon his earnings for support, if he be killed.
Id. (citing In re Derinza Case, 118 N.E. 942, 945 (Mass. 1918)).
722 [Vol. 39: p. 705
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adequate compensation for all employees and their dependents regardless
of residency.94
2. Disparate Death Benefits for Nonresident Aliens Are Unconstitutional
In Madera, the Supreme Court expressed its view that an employee
has the right under the workers' compensation scheme to have his depen-
dents provided for regardless of their residency. 95 This view, however, was
subsequently disregarded by many states that upheld the constitutionality
of disparate state workers' compensation statutes. 96 It was not until the
1989 Florida Supreme Court decision of De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau
Casualty Insurance Co.97 that an equal protection challenge of workers'
compensation statutory classifications was successful. 98
In De Ayala, the Florida Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Flor-
ida workmen's compensation statute that awarded substantially disparate
death benefits to nonresident alien dependents. 99 The De Ayala court
summarily rejected the state's argument that the nonresident dependent
94. Id. The Court also found that requiring the employer to provide for the
dependents of the employee would indirectly provide for the safety and protection
of the life of the employee. Id. The Court analogized workers' compensation ben-
efits to the benefits awarded under the Federal Employers' Liabilities Act ("FELA")
and cited several decisions that supported extending benefits to alien dependents
as well as citizens. Id.; see also Federal Employers Liability Act, ch. 3073, 34 Stat.
232 (1906), ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1988)), ch.
143, 36 Stat. 291 (1910) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 56, 59 (1988)), ch. 685, 53 Stat.
1404 (1939) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 54, 56, 60 (1988)); see also McGovern v. Phila-
delphia & Reading Ry., 235 U.S. 389, 400 (1914); Vetaloro v. Perkins, 101 F. 393,
397 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900). The Court emphasized that just
as the Federal Employers' Liability Act, in order to protect the life of the
employee gives compensation to those who had relation to it, it makes no
difference where they may reside; it being "the fact of their relation to the
life destroyed that is the circumstance to be considered, whether we con-
sider the injury received by them or the influence of that relation upon
the life destroyed."
Madera, 262 U.S. at 503-04 (quoting McGovern v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway,
235 U.S. 389, 400 (1914)).
Moreover, the Court noted: "[FELA and workmen's compensation statutes]
have the interest of the employees in mind and are primarily for the protection of
their lives; the action is given to the beneficiaries on their account and they are not
intended to be less protected if their beneficiaries happen to live abroad." Id.
95. Mandera, 262 U.S. at 500-03.
96. See Liberato v. Royer, 270 U.S. 535 (1926) (involving Pennsylvania exclu-
sionary statute); Micaz v. Compensation Comm'r, 13 S.E.2d 161 (W. Va. 1941) (in-
volving West Virginia statutory exclusion of alien nonresident beneficiaries). The
workmen's compensation statutes that were found constitutional contained special
rules limiting the death benefits awarded to nonresident alien dependents. For a
further discussion on several states that have upheld the constitutionality of dispa-
rate death benefit awards, see supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
97. 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989).
98. Id.
99. Id at 207.
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could not raise constitutional principles. 10 0 Instead, the court focused on
"whether a worker who happens to have dependents residing out of the
country is entitled to the same fruits of his or her labor as any other
worker, including the same insurance benefits where the state has re-
quired those benefits to be provided."''1 1 Accordingly, the court held that
the constitutionality of the statute was based on the employee's constitu-
tional rights and not the rights of the dependents.10 2
The De Ayala dissenters, however, disagreed with the majority's con-
clusion that the issue centered around the constitutional rights- of the
worker.' 05 The dissent attacked the legal basis from which the majority
drew this conclusion, finding that the law clearly supported the principle
that the employee's constitutional rights terminate at death. 10 4
3. Kansas Precedent: Employment Relationship Source of Workers'
Compensation Liability
Since the enactment of the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Statute,
the Kansas Supreme Court has established that the terms of the statute are
embodied within the employment contract, and the employer's liability to
the employee is a result of the employment relationship.' 0 5 The first Kan-
sas case establishing this principle was Moeser v. Shunk,10 6 in which the
Kansas Supreme Court held that the Kansas Workmen's Compensation
Statute was the means for establishing the liability of an employer to the
employee.' 0 7 In Moeser, the court found that although the employer's lia-
bility originally derived from the employment contract between the em-
100. Id at 206.
101. Id.
102. Id. The De Ayala court utilized the Florida Constitution to support the
conclusion that workers have the right to have their dependents provided for out
of past earnings. Id. Article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution expressly pro-
vides: "All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among
which are the right to enjoy life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for
industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property .. " Id. (emphasis added).
The court focused on the specific provision "to be rewarded for industry." Id.
103. Id. at 208 (Overton, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Overton, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973));
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
833 (1981);JOHN C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 38 (2d ed. 1921).
As support foi this position, the dissent relied on the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Roe and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's determi-
nation in Silkwood The dissent further espoused that "[i]t is an established
principle that neither a decedent nor anyone on a decedent's behalf is entitled to
assert a claim based on the decedent's constitutional rights." De Ayala, 543 So. 2d
at 208. (Overton, J., dissenting)
105. SeeBakerv. List, 563 P.2d 431 (Kan. 1977); Lyon v. Wilson, 443 P.2d 314
(Kan. 1968); Moeser v. Shunk, 226 P. 784 (Kan. 1924).
106. Moeser, 226 P. at 784.
107. Id. at 786.
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ployer and the employee, the state workmen's compensation statute
controlled the extent of such liability.10 8
A dependent's right to death benefits is an independent right defined
by the workers' compensation statute; however, all rights arise from the
employment relationship between an employer and an employee. 10 9 As
early as 1927, the Kansas Supreme Court in Routh v. List & Weatherby Con-
struction Co.,110 held that the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Statute
creates two causes of action, one for an employee while he is alive and the
other for his dependents when the employee dies."' The Routh court
determined that while a worker is alive the worker's dependents have no
right of action; however, upon the worker's death, a right of action ac-
crues to the worker's dependents and everything relates back to the time
of the accident."l 2
In two subsequent cases, Lyon v. Wilson 1 3 and Baker v. List,114 the
Kansas Supreme Court reiterated the proposition that the contract of em-
ployment initially creates an employer's liability to the employee, and that
the workers' compensation statute determines the substantive rights of the
parties. 1 5 These principles lead to several conclusions that are important
for determining whether the right to receive death benefits belongs to an
employee or lies solely in his dependents." 6 First, because the Kansas
Workmen's Compensation Statute is the means through which an em-
ployer is liable to the employee, and that liability arises from the employ-
ment contract between them, the statute should not deprive employees or
their dependents reasonable payment for injuries received as a result of
workplace accidents. 117 Second, because the rights of an employee's de-
pendents are independently created by the statute, a deceased employee
108. Id.
109. See Routh V. List & Weatherby Constr. Co., 257 P. 721 (Kan. 1927) (hold-
ing dependent's right to death benefits not affected by employee's actions prior to
death). But cf. Bennett Properties Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 437 P.2d 548 (Colo.
1968) (holding death benefits to be reduced by 50% for employee's willful viola-
tion of safety rule).
110. 257 P. 721 (Kan. 1927).
111. Id. at 723.
112. Id.
113. 443 P.2d 314 (Kan. 1968).
114. 563 P.2d 431 (KIn. 1977).
115. Lyon, 443 P.2d at 319; see also Baker, 563 P.2d at 437 (relying specifically
on its previous decision in Lyon to determine that "[t]he terms of the Workmen's
Compensation Statute are embodied in the contract of employment between the
employer and the employee.., and rights under the contract vest when the cause
of action accrues").
116. See Lyon, 443 P.2d at 319 (holding employer's liability to employee stems
from employment contract); Baker, 563 P.2d at 437 (noting that substantive rights
of parties are determined by Workmen's Compensation Statute, while initial em-
ployer's liability is created from original employment contact between employer
and employee).
117. See Moeser v. Shunk, 226 P. 784 (Kan. 1924) (allowing employee or de-
pendents to recover from both employer and negligent third party).
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cannot extinguish these rights by settlement or release prior to his
death.1 18 However, a dependent's rights are vested rights from the em-
ployee, and do not accrue until the date of an employee's death. 119 Fi-
nally, any rights of dependents originally result from the employer's
liability to the employee. 120 Accordingly, by 1993, it was well-established
as a matter of law that, in Kansas, a dependent's separate right of action
accrues at the time of the employee's death. This right is a result of the
employment contract between the employer and employee.' 2
1
III. JURADO V. POPEJOY CONSTRUCTION CO.: CASE DISCUSSION
A. Facts and Procedural History
On August 21, 1990, Fermin Jurado, a resident alien from Mexico,
was killed while working for Popejoy Construction Company ("Popejoy"),
located in Syracuse, Kansas. 12 2 Jurado was survived by his wife and three
children, all of whom were residents and citizens of the Republic of
Mexico.1 23
Soon afterJurado's death, his nonresident alien dependents received
$750 in death benefits pursuant to the Kansas Workmen's Compensation
Statute, K.S.A. 44-510b(i). 124 Significantly, under K.S.A. 44-510b(i), this
amount was substantially less than the maximum $200,000 in compensa-
tion benefits that were provided to all resident aliens and citizens of the
United States.' 25 Because of this gross disparity in death benefits, Jurado's
dependents brought an equal protection challenge in the state District
Court of Kansas, attacking the constitutionality of K.S.A. 44-510b(i).126
The state's district court upheld the constitutionality of the provision hold-
118. See Routh v. List & Weatherby Constr. Co., 257 P. 721 (Kan. 1927) (hold-
ing dependents' right to death benefits not barred by employee's prior release or
settlement with employer); see also LARSON, supra note 9, § 64.12 (same).
119. Baker, 563 P.2d at 437.
120. Id.
121. Baker, 563 P.2d at 436 (noting that "the liability of an employer to an
injured or deceased employee arises out of the contract between them").
122. Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669, 671 (Kan. 1993). At the
time of his death, Fermin A.Jurado was thirty-nine years old. Id. He had originally
come to the United States hoping to use the engineering degree he had received
in 1979 from the Technological Institute of the City of Juarez in Mexico. Id. He
planned to learn English and eventually pursue an occupation in engineering. Id.
123. Id. Jurado allegedly planned to send for his wife and children, ages
seven, four and two, when he learned English and saved enough money to obtain
an engineering position. Id.
124. Id. Aetna Life and Casualty Company paid this amount on behalf of
Popejoy. Id.
125. Id. The Kansas Workmen's Compensation Statute provides, in relevant
part: "If the employee does not leave any dependents who are citizens of or resid-
ing at the time of the accident in the United States, the amount of compensation
shall not exceed in any case the sum of $750." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510b(i)
(1992).
126. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 672.
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ing that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ex-
tends only to individuals residing in the United States. 127
Following the district court's decision, Jurado's dependents filed an
appeal with the Kansas State Court of Appeals that subsequently, was trans-
ferred to the Kansas Supreme Court upon a motion. On appeal, the de-
pendents urged the Jurado court to determine the constitutionality of the
statute based on the constitutional rights of the resident alien employee,
rather than on the dependents' rights as nonresident aliens.' 28 The Kan-
sas Supreme Court held that the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Statute
violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Kansas and United
States Constitutions. 129 Accordingly, the Jurado case was reversed and re-
manded for further proceedings.' 3 0
B. Narrative Analysis
In considering the constitutionality of the Kansas Workmen's Com-
pensation Statute, the Kansas Supreme Court posed a threshold question:
Did the determination of benefits involve the employee's constitutional
rights, or the rights of the dependents?' 3 ' In addressing this question, the
Jurado court summarily concluded that the constitutionality of the statute
involved a consideration of the constitutional rights of the employee,
rather than the rights of the employee's dependents.' 32
The Jurado court relied on the Florida Supreme Court's holding in De
Ayala to support the proposition that death benefits are a right of an em-
ployee.' 3 3 The Kansas Supreme Court attempted to refute the rationale
offered in Justice Overton's dissent in De Ayala. The court addressed this
dissent because the De Ayala majority offered no rationale supporting its
conclusion that death benefits are a right of the employee.' 3 4 Justice
127. Id. The district court found that the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and the Kansas State Constitution did not apply to non-
resident alien dependents. Id.
128. Id. Popejoy, however, argued that the dependents, as nonresident
aliens, were not protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. Rather, Popejoy claimed that the dependents, as nonresident
aliens, had no constitutional rights to advance, and thus, the statutory amount
awarded under the workers' compensation statute must stand. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. This was the same threshold question that the Florida Supreme
Court addressed in De Ayala. For a further discussion of this question, see supra
notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
132. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 672.
133. Id. at 673. The court quoted the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion in
De Ayala- "However, we do not perceive this case as hinging on the constitutional
rights of the surviving dependents, but on the constitutional rights of the worker,
now deceased." Id. (quoting De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance
Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1989)).
134. Id.; see also De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d
204, 208 (Fla. 1989) (Overton,J., dissenting). For a discussion ofJustice Overton's
dissent in De Ayala, see infra note 136.
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Overton contended that the statute's constitutionality revolved around the
rights of the employee's dependents, not the employee's.' 3 5 Therefore, the
Equal Protection Clause is not implicated because the dependents, as non-
resident aliens, have no constitutional rights.
The Jurado court specifically addressed Justice Overton's contention
that persons' constitutional rights terminate upon death.13 6 While agree-
ing with this argument in limited circumstances, the Jurado court ques-
tioned its applicability to the present issue and facts in question.15 7 The
Jurado court criticized the two primary cases cited for support in Justice
Overton's dissent, Roe v. Wade'3 8 and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,l s 9 find-
ing that they did not adequately sustain the conclusion that a worker's
constitutional rights, which stemmed from the employment contract and
preceded the worker's death, terminate upon his death.1 40 The Jurado
court summarily dismissed the applicability of Roe, stating that the United
States Supreme Court did not approach the issue of the termination of a
person's rights upon death, rather the Court found, at most, that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not protect a fetus that was not viable outside of
the womb.14 1 Turning to the Silkwood decision, the Jurado court did not
contest the finding that the civil rights of a person cannot be violated once
a person has died.142 However, the Jurado court indicated that, unlike the
Supreme Court in Silkwood, it was considering the accrual of disparate ben-
efits to a class of Kansas workers and their dependents that resulted from
an employment contract and compensation laws that existed prior to the
worker's death.143
Next, the Jurado court turned to Popejoy's argument that the Kansas
Supreme Court's decision in Routh v. List & Weatherby Construction Co., re-
quired the court to decide the constitutionality of the statute based on the
dependents' rights.'" While conceding that Routh established the exist-
135. De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 208 (Overton, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Overton, J., dissenting). Justice Overton concluded that "the heirs
and beneficiaries . . . can assert only their own rights-not the rights of the
corpse." Id. (Overton,J., dissenting). Thus, it follows that "[i]ncluded in human
beings, normal and abnormal, as legal persons, are all living beings having a
human form. But they must be living beings; corpses have no legal rights." Id.
(Overton, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting JOHN C. GRAY, THE NATURE
AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 38 (2d ed. 1921)).
137. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 673-76 (Kan. 1993).
138. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
139. 637 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 833 U.S. 248 (1981).
140. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 673.
141. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
142. Id. (holding that actions after employee's death cannot violate her civil
rights) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 833 U.S. 248 (1981)).
143. Id.
144. Id. In contrast to Justice Overton's argument, the Jurado court found
that the death benefits were a right of the employee because the benefits arose out
of the employment relationship and were, thus, part of the benefits package
24
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ence of two separate rights under the statute, the court nonetheless, found
that the dependents' separate right of action was derived from the de-
ceased employee, and therefore, all rights must relate back to the time of
the injury. 14 5
In further response to Popejoy's argument, the court cited several
Kansas Supreme Court decisions that recognized the employment rela-
tionship as the source of workers' compensation liability. 46 These deci-
sions gave credence to the court's finding that "the dependent's right of
action was derivative of and dependent upon the employee's contract of
employment."' 14 7 Accordingly, the court concluded that Popejoy's argu-
ment was inconsistent with Kansas law concerning the rights conferred by
the Workmen's Compensation Statute.' 48
The Jurado court posited that the dependents' right of action existed
solely as a result of the original employee-employer relationship, the work-
earned before the employee's death. Id. at 674. The Jurado court pointed to the
principles adopted by the Supreme Court in Madera, which established that the
purpose of workmen's compensation death benefits was to protect the employee's
interest by providing for the worker's family upon his death. Id.
145. Id. Specifically, the court analyzed the finding in Routh that
the right of action of dependents does accrue at the time of the accident,
and everything must relate back to the situation at this time, but the de-
pendents have no standing or independent right of action while the
workman is living. After his death they have such a right of action, which
in a sense does accrue after the death of the workman.
Id.
The Jurado court extrapolated on this analysis, to determine that dependents'
rights were derived from all rights held by the employee. Id. The court referred to
a dictionary definition of derivative: "coming from another; taken from something
preceding secondary. That which has not its origin in itself, but owes its existence
to something foregoing. Anything obtained or deduced from another." Id. (citing
BLAcK's LAw DICIONARY 399 (5th ed. 1979)). The court also cited the Supreme
Court's finding in Madera that the component parts of workers' death benefits
comprise a single system which arises out of the employment relationship. Id. at
674 (citing Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 262 U.S.
499, 500 (1921)).
In contrast, many state courts do not find that the rights of the dependents
are derivative; rather, dependents' rights to benefits are created directly from the
statute. See Garcia v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1336 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
(finding Notice of Claim Status denying deceased employee's claim does not affect
widow's right to death benefits because employee's rights and survivors' rights are
separate); Georgia Power & Light Co. v. Patterson, 166 S.E. 255 (Ga. Ct. App.
1932) (finding compromise by deceased of workers compensation rights does not
bar statutory rights of dependents). But see Bennett Properties Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 437 P.2d 548 (Colo. 1968) (upholding provision which reduced death
benefits by 50% for willful violation of safety rule). For additional information on
death benefits under workmen's compensation statutes and case discussions, see
LARSON, supra note 9, § 64.10-.11.
146. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 674-75 (citing Lyon v. Wilson, 443 P.2d 314, 321 (Kan.
1977); Baker v. List, 563 P.2d 431, 438 (Kan. 1968); Moeser v. Shunk, 226 P. 784,
788 (Kan. 1924)).
147. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 675.
148. Id.
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ers' compensation statute and the employment contract, all three of which
preexisted the worker's death.149 Thus, the Jurado court held that it was
entirely appropriate to focus on the rights and laws in effect prior to an
employee's death.' 50 Therefore, the Jurado court returned to its prelimi-
nary premise that the constitutionality of the Kansas Workmen's Compen-
sation Statute centered on the rights of the then-deceased employee,
Fermin Jurado.151
1. Equal Protection and Constitutionality of K.S.A. 44-510b(i)
The Jurado court next considered the statute in light of the equal pro-
tection framework under the Fourteenth Amendment. 152 Before specifi-
cally evaluating the statute, the Jurado court discussed the three standards
for determining the constitutionality of legislative classifications: the ra-
tional basis test, the substantial relationship test and the strict scrutiny
test. 153
Following this discussion, the court considered the specific Kansas
statutory classification that substantially limited workers' compensation
death benefits available for nonresident alien dependents. 5 4 The court
concluded, that although this provision did not discriminate based on the
employee's alienage, it did discriminate against a class of employees based
on their dependents' alienage. 155 The court found that this classification
was "based on alienage" and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.156
Once the Jurado court determined that the strict scrutiny standard was
appropriate, it addressed Popejoy's argument that K.S.A. 44-510b(i) was
constitutional even under a strict scrutiny standard. 15 7 Popejoy claimed
that the classification served a compelling governmental interest, which
justified the disparate treatment of aliens.' 5 8 The Jurado court, however,
refuted the claim that the administration of benefits overseas would entail
a high risk of fraud and create extreme financial hardships on the citizens
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 674-75.
152. Id. For a discussion of equal protection, see supra notes 26-40.
153. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 674-75. The court pointed out that while legislative
classifications were not prohibited as a matter of law, the Equal Protection Clause
required such classifications to be based on reasonable and legitimate legislative
objectives. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); Stephenson v. Sugar
Creek Packing Co., 830 P.2d 41 (Kan. 1992); Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058
(Kan. 1987)). For each standard of judicial scrutiny (the rational basis test, the
substantial relationship test and the strict scrutiny test), the Jurado court identified
the type of legislation to which each applied and the level of state justification
needed to satisfy the burden of each respective standard. Id. at 675-76.
154. Id. at 676.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 677.
158. Id.
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and insurance carriers of Kansas. 15 9 The Jurado court found that the ad-
ministration of benefits was not an "insurmountable task, due to the availa-
bility of a global economy."' 6° The Jurado court also discredited Popejoy's
argument that the citizens of Kansas would undergo serious financial loss
by noting that it was the employers' and insurers' responsibility to guaran-
tee adequate funds for employee benefits. 161
Concluding, the Jurado court reviewed the reasoning of court deci-
sions from four states that addressed the constitutionality of disparate
workers' compensation statutes. 16 2 Although courts from three of the
four states had upheld the constitutionality of such statutory schemes,
none of these courts considered the rights of the employee.16 3 The fourth
state supreme court decision considered by the Jurado court was the Flor-
ida case that was in accordance with Jurado, as both decisions focused on
the rights of the employee.'6
2. Justice McFarland's Dissent
Dissenting, Justice McFarland of the Kansas Supreme Court rejected
the majority's conclusion that the constitutionality of the Kansas Work-
men's Compensation Statute was based on a consideration of the constitu-
tional rights of the deceased employee.' 65 Rather, Justice McFarland
argued that the dependents' constitutional rights were the proper per-
spective from which to evaluate the statute's constitutionality. 166 Thus,
Justice McFarland concluded that an employee's dependents had no basis
for invoking the protection of the Kansas Constitution or United States
Constitution when the dependents were not residents of the United
States.' 67
Justice McFarland based his conclusion on three reasons. First, he
found that the majority's transferal of the constitutional rights of the de-
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (noting Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act requires all employers
to secure payment of employee benefits through private insurance carrier, self-
insurance or pool'insu'rance).
162. Id. at 678.
163. Id.
164. Id; see also Pena v. Industrial Comm'n, 644 P.2d 1319 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) (holding nonresidents not entitled to equal protection); Pedrazza v. Sid
Fleming Contractor, Inc., 607 P.2d 597, 603 (N.M. 1980) (upholding statute deny-
ing nonresident alien dependents' death benefits because dependents "not cov-
ered by [New Mexico s] Act"); Alvarez Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d
416 (Utah 1988) (upholding statute limiting death benefits of nonresident alien
dependents to one-half of standard benefits because United States Constitution
does not protect nonresident aliens).
165. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 678 (citing De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty
Insurance Co., 543 So. 2d 204 (1992)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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ceased worker to the nonresident alien dependents had no legal basis. 168
The dissent noted that the majority of states that incorporated special pro-
visions for nonresident alien dependents in workers' compensation stat-
utes reduced the death benefits awarded to nonresident aliens. 169 The
dissent further explained that, in three of the four cases cited by the ma-
jority, the respective state courts upheld the constitutionality of the stat-
utes based on the fact that nonresident alien dependents were not
protected. 170
Second, the dissent analogized death benefits under workers' com-
pensation statutes to benefits acquired under the Social Security Act.17 1
Under Social Security provisions, nonresident beneficiaries are subjected
to disparate treatment.172 Thus, Justice McFarland argued that the fed-
eral government's disparate treatment of nonresident aliens in the Social
Security context further supports the state's disparate treatment of nonres-
ident aliens under the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Statute. 173
Finally, Justice McFarland maintained that courts should not deter-
mine the constitutionality of the statute, rather, the legislature should ad-
dress the statute's disparate treatment of nonresident aliens by amending
K.S.A. 44-510b(i) . 74 Justice McFarland explained that, until the legisla-
ture acted, the Kansas statute must be presumed constitutional and all
168. Id.
169. Id. The majority in Jurado specifically noted:
The workmen's compensation laws in all but nine states have special pro-
visions for nonresident dependents. 'Five states expressly include nonres-
ident aliens on equal terms with other dependents; five states exclude
them from benefits altogether. Most of the rest provide for reduced ben-
efits or commutation of benefits to a lump sum on a reduced basis, and
many restrict the classes of beneficiaries.'
Id. (citing 2 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 63.50 (1992)). For
a further discussion on state decisions, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying
text.
170. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 679 (McFarland, J., dissenting). Subsequently, the
dissent criticized the majority's reliance on the Florida's Supreme Court's De Ayala
decision because the decision did not provide in-depth support or compelling
legal reasoning. Id. (McFarland, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed to the fact
that the Florida Constitution contained the provision "to be rewarded for indus-
try." Id. (McFarland, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent interpreted this provision
as serving as the basis for the Florida Supreme Court's decision. Id. (McFarland,
J., dissenting).
171. Id. (McFarland, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (McFarland, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that "[u] ntil re-
cent years, all nonresident aliens were precluded from receiving disability or survi-
vor benefits under the Act." Id. (McFarland, J., dissenting) (quoting Ganem v.
Heckler, 746 F.2d 844, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (discussing history of disparate treat-
ment of nonresident aliens under Social Security Acts); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(t) (1) (Supp. V. 1993). In 1969, an amendment was enacted which permit-
ted only those nonresident aliens that had lived in the United States for over ten
years to retain benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(t (4) (A)-(B) (Supp. V. 1993).
173. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 680.
174. Id.
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doubts resolved in its favor.1 75 Accordingly, he concluded that the district
court opinion should be affirmed and the statute upheld.1 76
IV. CRrrIcAL ANALYsis
The Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Jurado provided a compre-
hensive analysis of United States Supreme Court and Kansas precedent.
In Jurado, the court was in a difficult position. The Jurado court hoped to
remedy the inherent discrimination within the Kansas Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, but had little specific precedent on which to rely.177
Although the Florida Supreme Court, in De Ayala, had recently ruled on
the same issue and had struck down its workers' compensation statute, the
De Ayala court had offered little rationale for its conclusions.' 78 Accord-
ingly, the Jurado court turned to the Supreme Court decision most akin to
the facts and issues that were before it.1 79
The Jurado court extracted the principles espoused by the Supreme
Court in Madera and used them to justify the conclusion that death bene-
175. Id.; see, e.g., Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 834 P.2d 368 (Kan.
1992) (upholding constitutionality of state statute on basis that judicial deference
must be shown to legislative goals and constitutionality of statute must be
presumed).
176. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 680.
177. See id., at 678. The Jurado court's desire to provide a fair and equitable
solution is evidenced by the court's reasoning that:
One of the primary benefits that an employee works for is the satisfaction
and well-being of providing for his or her family. The law did not afford
... [an employee] different treatment while he was alive and working.
He shared the same 'burdens' as his fellow employees. He paid taxes and
contributed to the growth of his company and the general economy. His
labor ... helped pay for the employer's insurance premiums required
under the workers' compensation law. Common sense dictates he should
be entitled to the same 'benefits' regardless of the residence or status of
his dependents.
Id. at 677 (quoting De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 543
So. 2d 204, 207 (Fla. 1989)). Although the outcome of De Ayala was the same as
desired by the Kansas Supreme Court, the decision did not provide enough spe-
cific support for its conclusions. Id. For a further discussion of the De Ayala deci-
sion, see supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. But cf. Pena v. Industrial
Comm'n, 644 P.2d 1319 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Pedrazza v. Sid Fleming Contractor,
Inc., 607 P.2d 597 (N.M. 1980); Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416
(Utah 1988). For a further discussion on state decisions holding contrary toJurado
and De Ayala, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
178. De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins., Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 205-
07 (Fla. 1989).
179. SeeJurado, 853 P.2d at 674. The Supreme Court had not ruled on the
specific issue faced by the Jurado court; however, in Madera, the Supreme Court
had upheld the constitutionality of a workmen's compensation statute which ex-
plicitly provided for equal benefits to both citizens and nonresident aliens alike.
See Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 499 (1921). For a
further discussion of Madera, see supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
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fits are the right of workers.18 0 TheJurado court's reliance on these princi-
ples was well-founded, even though Madera was concerned with a violation
of the due process clause and not an equal protection challenge. 18 ' The
Jurado court appropriately focused on the Supreme Court's view of the
purpose of death benefits and the rights created under the workers' com-
pensation statutes.' 8 2
Moreover, the Jurado court's conclusion that death benefits were a
constitutional right of the employee was further supported by earlier Kan-
sas Supreme Court jurisprudence.' 8 3 These decisions established the
principle that the employment relationship is the original source of de-
pendents' rights, and that state workmen's compensation statutes merely
serve to define and limit these rights.' 8 4 Relying on these principles, the
Jurado court logically concluded that dependents' rights are derived from
rights once held by the employee.18 5
Significantly, Supreme Court precedent supports the Jurado court's
application of the strict scrutiny standard in reviewing the alienage classifi-
cations within the Kansas statute.1 86 Since Graham, the Supreme Court
has consistently applied the strict scrutiny standard when reviewing a state
statute that imposes alienage requirements for social and economical rea-
sons.' 87 Under the strict scrutiny standard, states are generally unsuccess-
180. SeeJurado, 853 P.2d at 673-74, 677. TheJurado court specifically relied on
the principles espoused by the Supreme Court in Madera.
181. Id.; see also Madera, 262 U.S. at 505.
182. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 669. Although the Supreme Court in Madera did not
specifically conclude that death benefits were the constitutional right of the
worker, it established that death benefits were provided for the benefit of the
worker in order to adequately provide for his dependents, regardless of his depen-
dents' citizenship. Madera, 262 U.S. at 500-04.
183. SeeBakerv. List, 563 P.2d 431 (Kan. 1977); Lyon v. Wilson, 443 P.2d 314
(Kan. 1968); Routh v. List, 257 P. 721 (Kan. 1927). Although, the Jurado court was
bound by an earlier Kansas Supreme Court decision establishing that dependents'
rights are separate and independent from the employee's rights, it adequatelyjus-
tified its conclusions by looking to other Kansas Supreme Court decisions. For a
further discussion on Kansas precedent concerning workmen's compensation
rights, see supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
184. See Baker, 563 P.2d at 433; Lyon, 443 P.2d at 316; Moeser v. Shunk, 226 P.
784 (Kan. 1924).
185. SeeJurado, 853 P.2d at 673-74. For a discussion on the derived rights of
dependents, see supra notes 80-121 and accompanying text. For a general discus-
sion of additional case law on this issue, see LARSON, supra note 9, § 64.10-.12.
186. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (argu-
ing for use of strict scrutiny for aliens because: (1) in many ways aliens are no
different than citizens; (2) aliens are subjects of irrational discrimination; and (3)
aliens possess little political power); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (invali-
dating state law excluding aliens from receiving state financial assistance in higher
education using strict scrutiny); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973).
187. See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero,
426 U.S. 572 (1976) (invalidating state statute prohibiting aliens from acquiring
license to practice civil engineering); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)
(applying strict scrutiny in review of state statute prohibiting aliens from state civil
service employment). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1286.
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ful in legitimizing alienage discrimination by claiming financial and
administrative hardship. 18 8 Thus, the Jurado court's rejection of the rea-
sons advanced by Popejoy was consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. 18 9
V. CONCLUSION
The Kansas Supreme Court took an important step in Jurado to en-
sure that all employees are afforded the right to death benefits regardless
of the citizenship of their dependents. The Jurado court recognized the
tragic story of Fermin Jurado, and the others like him, who have left their
families in order to provide a better life for them.
The Kansas Workers' Compensation Statute was enacted to replace
workers' rights of action against their employers for injuries arising in the
workplace. 190 Therefore, it was not rational for the Kansas statute to deny
employees the assurance that their families will be provided for upon their
death.1 9 1 This is particularly true because the employees are afforded this
right under the employment contract and common law tort principles. 192
The Jurado court's use of the strict scrutiny standard serves to ensure
that individuals will no longer face discrimination under the Kansas Work-
men's Compensation Statute based on their dependents' alienage. 193 The
holding recognizes that workers who actively participate in society by pay-
ing taxes, contributing to labor and facilitating the economic growth of
the state should be guaranteed the security of knowing their familial de-
pendents will be provided for, regardless of alienage.' 9 4
188. See Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 19 (concluding state's objective of preserving fi-
nancial resources for citizens does not alone constitute compelling state interest);
see also Mendoza v. Miami, 483 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejecting state's claim that
protection of employment rights of citizens supports statute that discriminates
against aliens).
189. SeeJurado, 853 P.2d at 676-77. For a discussion of theJurado court's rejec-
tion of Defendant Popejoy's claims of "special public interest" considerations, see
supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
190. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Supp. 1992).
191. See Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499,
502 (1921). In Madera, the Supreme Court espoused the principle that the pur-
pose of workers' compensation acts is " 'to provide for the liability of an employer
to make compensation for injuries received by an employee,' whether to the em-
ployee himself or to those who suffer pecuniary loss by reason of his death." Id.
(quoting Huyett v. Pennsylvania R.R., 86 N.J.L. 683, 684 (1901)).
192. See Moeser v. Shunk, 226 P. 784, 785-87 (Kan. 1924); see also De Ayala v.
Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1989) (finding
Florida workers' compensation system replaced rights formerly afforded workers
under common law).
193. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1286; Lanae Hol-
brook, Justice Barkett's FeministJurisprudence, 46 U. MiAMI L. REv. 1161 (May 1992)
194. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,. 724 (1973) (finding "[riesident aliens,
like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, and contribute to the economy in a
myriad of other ways to our society"); Madera, 262 U.S. at 503.
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Statutory classifications that limit or preclude workers' compensation
death benefits for employees based on their dependents' alienage inflict
inequality without a compelling justification.19 5 The Jurado court's deci-
sion guarantees that employers will not be encouraged to hire workers
with nonresident dependents for hazardous jobs.' 9 6 The principles em-
bodied in the Jurado decision may even promote the further introduction
of proper safety procedures and precautions because it will no longer be
cheaper for Kansas employers to pay death benefits to nonresident aliens,
rather than to implement safety standards.197
Those states that have not yet ruled on the constitutionality of dispa-
rate death benefit awards to nonresident aliens should look to Jurado for
guidance. However, many states have already determined this issue con-
trary to the principles set forth in Jurado.19 8 Considering the disparity
among the statesand the gross inequality which results in those states pos-
sessing disparate workers' compensation statutes, it is apparent that the
United States Supreme Court should be called upon to resolve this dis-
pute. To allow this invidious discrimination to continue, offends all sense
of equal justice under the law.
Mary K Shannon
195. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (argu-
ing aliens are politically powerless and often victims of unfair discrimination). The
Jurado court's use of strict scrutiny promotes the fair and equitable treatment of
aliens within future state statutory schemes. SeeJurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853
P.2d 669, 675-77 (1993). Close judicial scrutiny serves to ferret out the hostility
towards foreigners, which leads to legislative classifications enacted for illegitimate
motives. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 213 (1992).
196. See De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 206. The De Ayala court specifically noted the
"adverse effects that could result if... [the court] ... adopted the respondent's
analysis [awarding disparate death benefits to nonresident alien dependents]. It
conceivably might encourage some employers to selectively place aliens in the risk-
iest areas of their businesses. [L]iability to nonresident survivors would be minimal
if such a worker died." Id. at 207 n.7.
197. Id.
198. See Barge-Wagener Constr. Co. v. Morales, 429 S.E.2d 671, 677 (Ga.
1993) (upholding Georgia workmen's compensation statute finding reduced
award of death benefits to nonresident alien dependents did not violate federal
and state equal protection clauses). As recently as four days prior to the Jurado
decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the Georgia workmen's compen-
sation .statute which substantially limited death benefits to nonresident aliens. Id.
Contrary to the Jurddo decision, the Barge-Wagener court based its decision on the
premise that death benefits were the right of the dependents and were not derived
from the rights of the employee. Id. at 676. The Barge-Wagener and the Jurado
decisions exemplify substantial disparity among the states regarding the constitu-
tionality of disparate death benefit awards. See Pena v. Industrial Comm'n, 644
P.2d 1319 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding Arizona statute denying nonresident
alien dependents death benefits); Pedrazza v. Sid Fleming Contractor, Inc., 607
P.2d 597 (N.M. 1980) (upholding New Mexico statute denying nonresident alien
dependents death benefits); Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416 (Utah
1988) (upholding statute providing substantially disparate death benefits to non-
resident alien dependents).
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